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Trauma memories – like all memories – are
malleable and prone to distortion. Indeed,
there is growing evidence – from both
field and lab-based studies – to suggest
that the memory distortion follows a particular pattern. People tend to remember more trauma than they experienced,
and those who do, tend to exhibit more
of the “re-experiencing” symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). Our own research suggests that
the likely mechanism underlying that distortion is a failure in people’s source monitoring. After a traumatic experience, intentional remembering (effortful retrieval)
and unintentional remembering (intrusive
mental imagery) can introduce new details
that, over time, assimilate into a person’s
memory for the event. We believe that
understanding the role these factors play
in distorting people’s memories for traumatic experiences is both theoretically and
practically important, particularly given
their potential role in influencing people’s
recovery.

MEMORY DISTORTION FOR
TRAUMATIC EVENTS: THE ROLE OF
MENTAL IMAGERY
People’s memories for traumatic events
are – like their memories for more mundane events – easily distorted. Importantly,
memory distortion for traumatic events
appears to follow a particular pattern: people tend to remember more trauma than
they experienced, a phenomenon referred
to as “memory amplification.” Unfortunately, memory amplification carries real
consequences: the more amplification people demonstrate, the more likely they are
to report the “re-experiencing” symptoms
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associated with PTSD, such as intrusive
thoughts and images [e.g., (1, 2)]. Our
research program focuses on the mechanism by which memory amplification
occurs. Specifically, we suspect people confuse the information generated after a
traumatic event – both intentionally, for
example, via conversation with others, and
unintentionally, for example, via intrusive
imagery – with what really occurred during the event. Put another way, we suspect
the mechanism underlying memory amplification is a failure in people’s source monitoring that ultimately results in memory
distortion (3, 4). In this review, we provide an overview of the source monitoring
framework [SMF; (3, 4)], the evidence for
traumatic memory distortion, and the role
that we propose source monitoring errors,
particularly imagery-based errors, play in
promoting traumatic memory distortion.
First, let us briefly outline the tenets of
the SMF (3, 4). Put simply, the SMF states
that memory distortion occurs because we
do not store our memories with a label
specifying the origins of each individual
detail. Generally this approach is an appropriate use of our capacity-limited cognitive
resources and we employ simple heuristics to judge the origins of a particular
detail or entire memory. However, sometimes those heuristics fail us. For example, event details that have been repeatedly or vividly imagined can come to mind
more easily over time, and – if there is no
trace of the effort that went into imagining
those details – people can easily mistake
the accompanying sense of familiarity for
the familiarity that we know accompanies
genuine recollection (5). A significant body
of research has investigated the factors that

make source monitoring more or less difficult, and thus source monitoring errors
more or less likely to occur (3, 4). Many
of those factors are an issue for traumatic
experiences.
For example, traumatic events are
highly likely to be rehearsed extensively
in an intentional manner: victims will
often make a statement to police, be
exposed to media footage, and engage in
conversations with other friends, family,
doctors, or therapists (6). Each rehearsal
opportunity comes with the potential for
the inadvertent suggestion of misleading details [e.g., (3, 4, 7, 8)]. In addition, traumatic experiences are also frequently rehearsed in unintentional ways
via intrusive images, thoughts, and memories; the “re-experiencing symptoms” typically associated with PTSD [e.g., (9)].
Sometimes, those thoughts and images
will reflect genuinely experienced aspects
of the event; sometimes, however, they
may be memory traces of similar events
witnessed in the news or entertainment
media. In either case, people may inadvertently generate additional imagery relating
to those traces that fits with the experienced event. Critically, over time, those
non-experienced thoughts and images may
become just as familiar as those that were
experienced, increasing the likelihood of
source monitoring errors (3, 4).
Several lines of converging evidence
now document that people are susceptible to memory distortion for experiences of
trauma, regardless of whether that trauma
is a single event (such as a motor vehicle
accident) or a sustained stressful experience that might involve multiple trauma
types (such as military deployment). One
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line of research examines the impact of
an external source of suggestion, such as
suggestive questioning, on peoples’ memories for surprising, traumatic, and public events [e.g., (7, 8, 10–17)]. For example, Nourkova et al. (11) convinced people that they had witnessed a non-existent
wounded animal in the film footage of
the Moscow apartment bombings [(10–
14); September, 1999]. Similarly, Crombag et al. (8) led participants to believe
they had seen the moment an El Al Boeing 747 crashed into an apartment building, killing 43 people. Although there was
no film of the crash, there was considerable media coverage of the aftermath.
Indeed, participants often elaborated on
the original suggestion (e.g., the plane was
already burning when it crashed). Importantly, and in line with the SMF, Crombag
et al. opined that traumatic events might
be more susceptible to memory distortion
than benign events because they typically
provide more avenues for mental imagery,
which can make source monitoring more
difficult, and thus source monitoring errors
more likely to occur (3, 4).
A second line of research with real victims of personal trauma examines how
they remember their traumatic experience
over time. These studies demonstrate that
such victims often come to report being
exposed to traumatic events they did not
initially report experiencing (9, 18–25). For
example, Southwick et al. (1) asked Desert
Storm veterans at 1 month and 2 years after
their return from service, whether certain events occurred during that service
(e.g., sniper fire). They found 88% of veterans changed their response to at least
one event; 61% changed more than one.
Importantly, the majority of those changes
were from “no, that did not happen to
me” to “yes, that happened to me,” what
has been termed “memory amplification.”
How can we explain the change? One possibility is that the veterans were also exposed
to external sources of suggestion during
the intervening period. Additionally, the
intrusive re-experiencing symptoms that
typically accompany trauma exposure may
have stimulated the production of other
thoughts and images related to war-time
experiences. In support of this possibility,
Southwick et al. reported that the more
severe the veteran’s re-experiencing symptoms, the more likely they were to exhibit

Memory distortion in analog trauma

memory amplification [see also Ref. (19,
21, 23)].
Our research provides a third line of
evidence for the existence of traumatic
memory distortion and the role mental
imagery plays in that distortion. In our
research, we have systematically examined
the influence of source monitoring errors
using a laboratory-based trauma analog.
In one study, we showed participants a
series of film clips depicting a fatal car
accident (2). Each clip was separated by
2 s of blank screen, which allowed us to
remove some scenes from the film. The
next day participants returned to the laboratory for a surprise recognition memory test – comprised of scenes they had
seen the day before (“old”), scenes we had
removed from the original film (“missing”), and scenes depicting other road settings (“new”). The participants’ job was to
identify whether each clip was old or new
and how confident they were in that decision. Importantly, we divided the missing
clips into cruxes (scenes critical to the film’s
meaning; e.g., a child screaming for her parents) – which were also rated as the most
traumatic scenes – and non-cruxes (more
peripheral scenes; e.g., the arrival of a rescue helicopter). We found that participants
were very good at recognizing what they
had and had not seen. However, they also
falsely claimed to have seen 26% of the
missing clips, or an additional 13.5 s of the
event. Moreover, participants were more
likely to falsely remember seeing the cruxes,
the more traumatic scenes, compared to the
non-cruxes.
Drawing on the SMF, we proposed that
there are at least two, possibly related,
routes to the pattern of memory distortion
we observed, both of which rely on mental
imagery (3, 4). First, we argued that it is
possible participants recognized that there
were gaps in the film and intentionally generated imagery – that echoed the content of
the missing clips – to fill those gaps (4). Second, we argued that it is also possible participants did not notice the gaps in the film
and instead their intrusive thoughts and
images about the film happened to echo
the content of the missing clips [e.g., (19)].
Of course, these two routes are not mutually exclusive: both rely on source monitoring failures, both may involve conscious
and unconscious elements, and therefore
both are likely to play a role in distorting
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participants’ memories for the film. Nevertheless, we argued that if source monitoring errors were responsible for the memory distortion we observed, we should be
able to manipulate the likelihood of those
errors by encouraging different approaches
to source monitoring.
Therefore, in a subsequent study, using
the same film, we first drew attention to
the gaps at encoding and then attempted
to induce different approaches to source
monitoring (26). Specifically, some participants saw visual static – just like the
“snow” on an untuned television – for the
duration of the missing clips. This static
clearly identified that the film was missing
particular scenes. We compared the memory performance of those participants to
the performance of participants who simply saw our original film, which did not
highlight the missing scenes (2). Here, we
found that highlighting the missing scenes
had no impact on the pattern of memory
distortion we observed.
However, we included two further conditions – where participants also saw visual
static highlighting the missing scenes –
to test the impact of different source
monitoring strategies. First, we warned
some participants before encoding that
we had removed some scenes. The purpose of this warning was to encourage a more systematic source monitoring approach – a slower, more deliberate
and controlled, style – when these participants came to evaluate what they had
and had not seen at test. Indeed, basic
memory research demonstrates the effectiveness of similar advanced warnings [e.g.,
(27, 28)]. Our results suggested the warning worked: warned participants exhibited less memory distortion than unwarned
participants. Second, we also included a
condition where participants saw a brief
written description of the missing scenes
overlaying the visual static. The purpose
of this label was to specify the missing
content so that participants could imagine what occurred between the depicted
scenes. Related research has shown that
the more detail people are given about
a scenario, the easier it is for them to
imagine that scenario (4, 29). Thus, we
expected that if participants did generate
mental imagery that fitted with the label,
then the missing scenes would feel more
familiar at test and participants would
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rely on a more heuristic – more rapid,
non-deliberative, less controlled – source
monitoring approach (4). Here too, the
data supported our predictions: people
exhibited more memory distortion when
they saw a label specifying the missing
content. Taken together then, our research
provides indirect evidence that mental
imagery plays a role in traumatic memory
distortion.
Of course, there are significant methodological limitations to keep in mind when
evaluating all laboratory-based research on
traumatic memory. Although laboratory
research can provide critical insights as a
result of tightly controlled experimental
designs, it is frequently a poor analog for
an event that meets the criteria described
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorder’s (5th Ed.) Criterion A
(30). For example, the stress and traumainduction procedures researchers employ
cannot ethically or morally reach the levels
people experience in a real-world trauma.
Moreover, participants are typically “witnesses” to an experience rather than the
“victim” of the experience, the duration of
the events is limited and delays are often
truncated to meet experimental demands.
Nevertheless, we believe that developing
a better understanding of source monitoring errors and the role of mental imagery
in traumatic memory distortion should be
a research priority. How people exposed
to trauma remember and misremember
aspects of their experiences in ways that
influence their recovery is both theoretically and practically important. For example, the touted correlation between the likelihood a person will develop PTSD and
the severity of their experienced trauma
is largely based on observed correlations
between self-reported current symptoms
and retrospective reports about the severity
of the trauma [e.g., (1, 19)]. That relationship – likely distorted and exacerbated by a
person’s current memory for the event –
could well be masking other, better predictors of PTSD. Thus, to determine the
true psychological impact of trauma, and
therefore the best ways to treat maladaptive
reactions to that trauma, we must know to
what extent memory (in)accuracy plays a
role. Hence, we will continue to investigate
the extent, causes, and triggering conditions of errors in memory for traumatic
experiences.
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